LeakLess: Selective Data Protection Against Memory Leakage Attacks for Serverless Platforms

Abstract

LeakLess is an approach for protecting secret data against memory disclosure vulnerabilities and transient execution attacks on serverless computing platforms that use language-level sandboxing to run untrusted code. LeakLess relies on selective in-memory encryption of developer-annotated sensitive data and addresses the limitations of previous selective data protection techniques by combining in-memory encryption with a separate I/O module. This enables the safe transmission of protected data between serverless functions and external hosts. We implemented LeakLess on the Spin serverless platform and evaluated it with real-world serverless applications. Our results demonstrate that LeakLess provides robust protection while incurring only a minor throughput decrease—up to 2.8% when the I/O module runs on a different host than the Spin runtime, and up to 8.5% when it runs on the same host.

Publication
In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). San Diego, CA